and Labovitz et al. (2000) noticed that sometimes it takes border gateway protocol (BGP) a substantial amount of time and messages to converge and stabilize following the failure of some node in the Internet. In this paper, we suggest a minor modification to BGP that eliminates the problem pointed out and substantially reduces the convergence time and communication complexity of BGP. Roughly speaking, our modification ensures that bad news (the failure of a node/edge) propagate fast, while good news (the establishment of a new path to a destination) propagate somewhat slower. This is achieved in BGP by allowing withdrawal messages to propagate with no delay as fast as the network forward them, while announcements propagate as they do in BGP with a delay at each node of one (except for the first wave of announcements). As a by product of this work, a new stateless mechanism to overcome the counting to infinity problem is provided, which compares favorably with other known stateless mechanisms (in RIP and IGRP).
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Convergence Problem
A STRONG relationship between the topological structure of the internet and the time it takes BGP to converge following the detachment of a subnet has been shown in two recent papers [1] and [2] . In [1] , the authors go as far as making the following recommendation.
"Our results show that customers sensitive to fail-over (should read fail-down, ABS) latency should multihome to larger providers, and that smaller providers should limit their number of transit and backup transit interconnections." In [2] , the authors claim they "can certainly improve BGP convergence through the addition of synchronization, diffusing updates, and additional state information, but all of these changes to BGP come at the expense of a more complex protocol and increased router overhead." In this paper, we further analyze the problem, and suggest a minor modification to the code of BGP that significantly improves the convergence latency, without any modification to BGP's messages format or any other part of BGP. Thus eliminating the negative effects that the desired extra transit and backup transit connections have on today's BGP routing protocol (as per the quote above).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JSAC. 2004.836002 The reduction in the convergence latency of BGP plays a major role in providing quality-of-service (QoS) and highly available services on the Internet. As shown in [1] and [2] , current BGP behavior results in fail-down latency of 3-15 min. Where fail-down is the failure and detachment of a destination from the network (i.e., failure without an alternative path to the detached router/network), while fail-over is when the failure introduces a new longer (backup) path. In either case, our modifications reduce the convergence latency to about 10-15 s (on the same scenarios that were analyzed in [1] and [2] ).
B. Related Work
An important parameter in the convergence time of BGP is timer. Basically, it is the amount of time BGP enforces between the sending of consecutive announcements from a router to its neighbors (currently set to 30 s). In [2] , it is proved that the fail-down convergence time is , where is the longest simple path to a destination ( the number of nodes in the network in the worse case). However, in [2] , it is also shown that without timer each router may explore all possible simple routes to a destination and, hence, may send messages. Moreover, [3] shows that in this case, we also may get unacceptably long convergence time. Simulation done by [3] shows that for each specific network topology there is an optimal value of that minimizes the converge time. However, since this value varies from network to network the technique cannot be a general mechanism to improve BGP. In this paper, we show that by slightly modifying BGP rules, of when to send withdrawals and announcements, we benefit from the timer and improve the convergence time in a general network, and even decrease its message complexity.
While researchers started to analyze and study the BGP convergence problem only recently [1] - [8] , the basic problem observed is not new. It is a variant of the known "counting to infinity" problem, that occurs in distance vector routing protocols [9] , [10] in a different disguise (of course, in BGP the counting is limited since BGP is using the to avoid loops). There are known techniques to overcome this problem that add state information to the BGP messages [11] , [12] . Introducing these changes into BGP would make it a more expensive and complex protocol.
There are other solutions that do not require state information [13] , [14] , such as, reverse poisoning (used in RIP [13] ), route poisoning with hold-down timers and trigger update (that are used in Cisco's IGRP [14] ). The RIP technique, reverse poisoning, is not relevant to BGP since it is designed to break length two loops and the easily achieves this and much more. The IGRP technique route poisoning with hold-down-timers, on the other hand, could be employed in BGP but would have devastating effects on its performances. Mostly because it is a nonscalable solution which is good for limited size networks. Essentially, it first cleans the entire network from the old routes and after waiting long enough time to guarantee that the old route does not exist any more in the network, it starts computing a new route. Waiting for such a long time in BGP is prohibitive. A detailed discussion of the relations between the presented technique and various counting-to-infinitely prevention techniques is given in Section IX.
A new solution to reduce the convergence time complexity was recently introduced in [8] . It uses the information provided in the to define route consistency assertion and uses these assertion to identify infeasible routes. However, this technique requires extra computation resources from the router to compute the consistency check, and to send extra information in the BGP messages. This technique may run into difficulties in some pathological cases, when an autonomous system (AS) partitions-and some router in the AS becomes disconnected from other routers in the same AS.
C. Ghost Flushing Solution
In this paper, we take a somewhat different view on the problem of convergence latency in BGP. Abstractly, the problem is that one lie makes many and in computer networks it continues recursively. That is, following the failure of a destination or some links to a destination, there are pieces of incorrect information (lies) floating in the network for a relatively long period of time. These pieces of information are reminiscent of the paths to a destination that was detached from the network, hence, called ghost information. To make things worse, some routers rely on the false information to generate more false information. In this way, convoys of false information travel in the network until they disappear. Throughout this period of time, there are routers in the network with the wrong information on the route to the destination. Notice that the ghost information disturbs the convergence both in the case of fail-over and fail-down.
Two basic but simple modifications of BGP are suggested in this paper ghost flushing rule and ghost buster rule. Ghost flushing rule is the key contribution, the ghost buster rule mostly serves as a tool to understand why the ghost flushing rule works so well. We also analyze a third suggestion, called reset rule, which shades more light on the convergence behavior of BGP.
The simplest and the one that makes the most difference is the ghost flushing rule presented in Section V, in which extra withdrawal messages are injected in order to flush the ghost information from the network. Essentially, under the ghost flushing rule a router sends a withdrawal of a prefix to its neighbors as soon as it learns (with no delay) that the last AS path it has announced for that prefix has been changed and became longer or not valid. The withdrawals generated by the flushing rule inform the neighbor router that the previously announced is no longer valid. This solution reduces the convergence latency to (from in current BGP), where is the length of the longest that a router in the network has to the destination, before the failure of that destination ( 20) and is the average delay between two neighboring BGP routers. Effectively reducing the fail-down convergence latency from several minutes to about 10-30 s on the same scenarios that were analyzed in [1] and [2] (in which is about 7, and is less than 2 s) see Figs. 6 and 7(b) . Notice that the reduction in the convergence latency comes with a corresponding reduction in the message complexity, message loss, and retransmission.
While the minor modification suggested here considerably improves the fail-down convergence latency, it usually also improves the fail-over convergence complexity. This is because in many cases the ghost information also disturbs and confuses the routers with outdated information (except in some pathological cases which are analyzed in Section V-A).
Simulating and verifying the effectiveness of ghost flushing, we noticed that it performs in reality (actual Internet topologies and standard BGP implementation) better than expected. Analyzing the results, we concluded that the reason for the better than expected convergence is the way in used in BGP. To better understand this behavior, we devise yet another modification, the ghost buster rule in Section VI, in which we force additional delays similar to the . This modification primarily serves as a tool to understand and analyze the reasons due to which the ghost flushing modification of BGP works better than expected.
The observation is, that if the ratio between the time it takes an announcement message to traverse one hop, to the time it takes a withdrawal message, is , where is the time by which the announcement is delayed at each node, then the convergence time of the protocol is , where is the diameter of the network. The difference between the ghost flushing rule and the ghost busting rule is that in the former announcement messages may initially not be delayed by the (as is in existing BGP implementations) and in the later, we ensure that any announcement whether after a long quiescent period or not, is delayed by a delay before being forwarded, i.e., the busting rule guarantees that announcements are always delayed. The second observation on the flushing rule, which results in a different variant of BGP, called reset rule is actually a sequence of two observations with the same principle (Section VII): delay announcements long enough to ensure that all the ghost information has been removed by the withdrawal messages, i.e., taking a global approach to first "clean" the network from ghost information and only then to allow announcement propagation. While this variant has the disadvantage of delaying announcements, also valid ones, for a long time and, hence, it is not practical, it shades light on the actual convergence behavior of BGP. Table I summarizes the convergence time complexity and message complexity following a fail-down event (i.e., the upper bound on the total number of messages sent due to the event) for BGP with with and with the two modifications suggested in this paper, the Ghost flushing rule, and the Ghost buster rule.
The results presented are supported by simulation in which the convergence time of the original BGP and of the modified BGP are measured and compared in several different settings. These results which are presented in Section VIII support our analysis that the modifications suggested in this paper considerably improve BGP's convergence complexity. 
II. BGP SHORT OVERVIEW
BGP is a distance and path vector routing protocol. Meaning that with each destination (prefix) in the routing table an is associated, and the corresponding is sent with each update sent on this destination to the neighboring peers. The is the sequence of ASes along the preferred path from the router to the destination. For each destination a router records the last announcement (with the ) it has received from each of its peers (neighboring BGP routers). Then, for each destination the router chooses one of the peers as the next-hop on the preferred path to that destination. Usually, the router picks the peer that announced the shortest , however, BGP is much more sophisticated and enables a more complex path selection according to policy. A router running BGP may also take a policy decision, such as, not to send or not to receive a specific announcement from different neighboring peers. For example, an AS may avoid announcing its to a destination, since it does not want to be a transit network for that destination.
Careless usage of the sophisticated mechanisms could lead to unsafe policies [6] , which could result in route oscillations. Some possible mechanisms to avoid these problems were introduced in [4] and [5] . However, in this paper, we do not deal with this problem.
The main motivation and usage of the is in avoiding cycles in the routing protocol. This is achieved by each router simply invalidating any route that includes the router's own AS number in the . Some mechanisms to avoid route oscillations (which is not the problem addressed here) were introduced in [4] and [5] .
BGP is an event driven (incremental) protocol where a router sends an update to its peers only when its preferred to a destination has changed. There are two types of messages exchanged between peering BGP routers: announcements and withdrawals. A router sends an announcement when its preferred to a destination has been changed or when it has a route to a new destination. Withdrawal messages are sent when a router learns that a subnetwork (i.e., destination) is no more reachable through any of its interfaces. To avoid avalanches of messages and to limit the rate at which routers have to process updates, it is required in BGP that after sending an announcement for a destination a router waits a minimum amount of time before sending an announcement again for the same destination, or to any destination (it is recommended by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to set this delay, called to 30 s [15] ). However, the delivery of a withdrawal message is never delayed because BGP tries to avoid "black holes," in which messages are sent to a destination which is no longer reachable. See Fig. 2 for a high-level pseudocode of BGP.
In this paper, we consider four types of events that may occur in a BGP at a router. The events may be either due to a change in the Internet topology (failure or recovery of either a router or a link) or due to a change in a routing policy. The way BGP with our modification handles the events is independent of whether the event is due to a topological change or routing policy change.
• -A previously unavailable destination is announced as available at a router. • or fail-down-A previously available destination is announced as unavailable at a router. • -A preferred to a destination implicitly replaces a less preferred (e.g., the path is becoming shorter). • or fail-over-The to a destination is replaced by a worse (longer) one. This happens for example, if the preferred route fails.
III. BGP MODEL
We define the network graph as a bidirectonal graph , where the set of nodes corresponds to the different AS's, and the set represents BGP sessions between AS's. Following [1] and [4] , and for the sake of simplicity, we associate one router with each and one router with each destination. However, as it was shown in [8] , one router cannot be associated with all the routers in the , since due to traffic engineering characteristics of BGP, different routers in the same may announce different routes to the same destination. Similar to [8] one can overcome this problem by introducing virtual AS's. A new virtual AS is introduced whenever there is a maximal proper subset (i.e., subset not equal) of routers of a previously defined AS such that all the routers in that subset route along the same path to a destination. The correctness of our modifications and their analysis relies on the property of a valid in convergence time, as was defined in the model of simple path vector protocol (SPVP) [8] , which is given below (Definition 1). Notice that our algorithms and analysis do not depend on (i.e., may be more general) the full model that was introduced in [7] (e.g., our work does not rely on the consistency between different AS paths present in a routing table in the same router). Moreover, while [8] captures the real-time model of the BGP, it ignores the impact of the timer, which is mandatory for our work.
Unless it says otherwise, all the discussions in this paper are with respect to destination . Let be the last to announced by router . Definition 1:
is a valid path in convergence time, if there exist a simple path in the network graph. Then for every , . We define the routing tree to destination at convergence time as the tree induced by the routing decisions of the routers in the network when the network is in a stable state, i.e., the set of links on which traffic to would be forwarded. The graph is a tree, due to the property of a valid path in convergence time, and the assumption that each node in the graph has only one route to the destination.
Notice, that we make no assumption on the way a router chooses its preferred . While the default in BGP is to choose the shortest , a router may override this default and choose its preferred according to any complex policy defined in the router or some matric supported by BGP. We define the network diameter as the longest simple preferred before the fail-down event.
IV. GHOST INFORMATION
The main issue of this paper is how to deal with outdated pieces of information floating in the network. More specifically how to distinguish between correct and incorrect pieces of information, which we call ghost information.
Let us follow the example given in [1] and [2] described slightly differently, exposing what we believe is the essence of the problem.
For ease of explanation only, we give the scenario in a synchronous network, where at each round the router receives the messages sent in the previous round, calculates its new state, and sends new messages to its peers if required. The duration of each round is s, which we assume, for simplicity, as 1 s. For the ease of the explanation, assume for this example that if a router has to update its to one of a few equal length , then it chooses the that begins with the smallest number.
Consider the topology shown in Fig. 1(a) in which is connected to all the four AS's, which are connected in a clique. Let all the in the clique route to through . Consider the case where withdraws its route to since network becomes unreachable and, hence, should be withdrawn from all the router's routing tables. However, at the time becomes unreachable, the false information is still in the network. Moreover, as was explained above, nodes start to use and rely on the false information and, thus, the ghost information start to travel around the network building longer and longer until they include a cycle. Formally, we define (we omit the use of , which is the same for all).
Definition 2: is a ghost information if it is not a valid AS path held or stored by one of the routers during the convergence period. Fig. 1 . Illustration of the ghost information problem in a clique. Next to each node, we write its current ASpath (with ASpath = . . . above or below the node). This is the path to the destination dst that appears in this node routing table in the corresponding snapshot. Next to the node, we depict the ASpath that the node has sent in the last announcement, preceding this round, which is the ASpath its peers believe this router has. The ASpath of the current announcement message (if exists) in a frame. The letter w stands for a withdrawal message. The ghost information may be also in the that a router stores as the last received from its neighbor. Formally, we denote by the last to that received from router . This may be different from the actual of , since may send another announcement with a new , which has not yet received. Formally, we define the following.
Definition 3: is a ghost information if this is not a valid path in router at convergence time, or there is some message in transmit between to with an different than . Coming back to the example, after receiving a withdrawal from AS 0 chooses according to the ghost information, the last announcement it received from , and would send an announcement saying that any router that was used to reach through it should use the path 410. Notice how the ghost information, the existence of a path through to , traverses in the network. In time , it is responsible for the ghost at , , and . This ghost information then traverses and becomes at time the ghost at and and the ghost at . In the next round [(c) ], learns that if it chooses to route through the new path should be 120, since changes its path to 20. However, cannot update its peer about the change in its until at least 30 s have passed from the previous announcement sent. Here, we see the negative effect of that delays the elimination of false (ghost) information. In this round also, learns that all the other ASes are routing though it-and, hence, it would change the to {} and send immediate withdrawal to all of its peers. As a result of this, in , changes its to
. Notice that because of the rule, does not learn that now all the ASes route through it until , where all the ASes would send the next announcement. This delayed convergence yields a 62 s (rounds) convergence. As noted in [1] , in most cases, the architecture is more complex and the average convergence latency is 3 min and more.
In [2] , a detailed scenario is given, showing that the convergence time is seconds with message complexity , where is the number of nodes (AS's), and is the number of links.
Observing the above scenario, one may conclude that the large (30 s)
is the source of the problem and that by drastically reducing it the problem would be solved. However, as shown in [1] , without this delay the message complexity of the convergence process jumps to and as mentioned before the load on the routers would drastically increase. Since without the timer that delays the propagation of announcements every node may explore any possible combination of value until converging to the stable shortest paths.
V. GHOST FLUSHING RULE
In order to quickly flush the ghost information from the network one should update, as fast as possible its neighbor whenever the previous it was advertising is not valid any more. This is done by the following modification.
When the distance to destination dst is updated to a worse ASpath AND a minRouteAdver time did not elapse since the last announcement then send withdrawal (dst) to all neighboring BGP peers.
Notice that if more than has passed since the last announcement was sent, then it will send an rather than a withdrawal.
In Fig. 2 , lines 16a-16d are the only modification (addition) to the traditional BGP pseudocode. The above modification uses withdrawal as a mechanism to flush the ghost information. Unlike in the traditional BGP, where the withdrawal messages are used to indicate that there is absolutely no path to the destination, here the withdrawal messages are used to indicate that the previously sent is not valid anymore. Moreover, here the router that sends the withdrawal might have a route to the destination, and it routes packets to destination according to its new . We need to use the withdrawal message only in the cases where the rule prevents us from sending the new , i.e., the withdrawal message plays the role of telling the neighbor router that the last announced to him, is irrelevant (not a valid path).
Notice, that the router cannot announce the new to its neighbor, since this solution led to message complexity. We call this message a flush withdrawal, to indicate its special functionality, however, it is implemented by a regular withdrawal message. Essentially, this would result in a wave of withdrawal messages flushing a ghost . Any node that is the source of the ghost information sends in this process a withdrawal message and the nodes depending on that information also erase the erroneous information and forward the wave of withdrawal messages. Thus, any in the network that depends on a ghost information is, thus, flushed as fast as possible. The flushing progresses quickly along the paths because the does not apply to the withdrawal messages. Let be a bound on the time it takes a BGP message (announcement or withdrawal) to traverse between neighboring BGP routers, including the processing time, then the time complexity is reduced to (Lemma 5.1) from and the total message complexity is reduced to from (Lemma 5.2). Notice that , while is 30 s is 1-2 s. Hence, we reduce the message complexity and the time complexity by at least a factor of 15.
Notice, that it is enough that the withdrawal message is sent only if the is changed to a less preferred one, since ghost information may harm convergence only if the ghost information is preferred over the into which the process converges. Since the ghost flushing rule is applied only when there is a less preferred path, the application of the rule does not effect the time convergence or message convergence in the events of and in comparison to the original BGP. Notice, that the decision whether the is less preferred is a local decision according to the preference of the router that receives the BGP message.
We prove these results in the following lemmas. All the lemmas and definitions are with respect to a destination not specifically mentioned.
Lemma 5.1: The time it takes BGP with the flushing rule to converge following an is . Proof: Let node become unreachable to all its neighbors due to a failure. This lemma follows from Claim 1 below according to the following argument: We prove by induction that seconds after the to destination of any node in the network is longer than . Hence, after units of time all the nodes would withdraw their route (because the maximum valid in BGP is of length , due to BGP loop detection mechanism).
Definition 4: We define as the length of the . Claim 1: At time every message or node has an . Proof by Induction: Let the node become unreachable due to the failure. The basis of the induction: consider the nodes that are at distance 1 from the . After the failure, at time -they learn that it is impossible to reach directly, hence, the new . Inductive
Step: Consider the of the nodes at time . From the induction hypothesis at time , the of any nodes in the network is longer than . Hence, also at time , the of nodes in the network is longer than , since the in the network can only grow in length (if the destination does not become connected again during that time). We now prove that there is no node with at time . Assume to the contrary: there exists node with . Let us look at time , where node changes to this , since it received an announcement from some peer , where . Since we prove that from time there is no node with shorter or equal to , there must be a time before , where the of was change to less preferred . By our modification at this time, sends a withdrawal to its peers or a new if it did not send an announcement in the last . The withdrawal message is received at before time and, hence, we arrive at a contradiction to the assumption that has an with length equal to . Sketch of proof: According to the algorithm, at least must elapsed between one announcement to the next. Here, we claim that at most one withdrawal message is sent by any node between two consecutive announcement messages. This is because in line in Fig. 2 , is set to an empty set, and this value prohibits any other withdrawal messages (line in Fig. 2 ) because no message can generate a path longer than the empty path. Hence, in after the first announcement, there is a maximum of two messages-one announcement and one withdrawal.
Lemma 5.3: The convergence message complexity of BGP with the flushing rule following is Straightforward from lemma 5.2 and 5.1. Fig. 3 describes a detailed scenario of the same situation as in Fig. 1 . Clearly, the scenario is much shorter in time since the flushing technique is used. Notice that the time is reduced from to s. Fig. 3 . Depicting the same situation as in Fig. 1 . Clearly, the scenario is much shorter in time since the flushing technique is used.
A. Fail-Over
So far, we discussed the effect of the ghost flushing rule on the convergence complexity following the disconnection of a destination. Here, we discuss the impact of the flushing rule in the case that a path has failed and the destination is still reachable but through a longer path. In this case (fail-over), there is a valid substitute path to the destination . One may wonder if the ghost flushing rule may not harm the convergence complexity in case of . Since due to the ghost flushing rule, one may announce withdrawal even if there is an alternate path. Notice, however, that in the ghost flushing rule, a withdrawal is announced only in the case in which due to BGP timer, the router cannot announce the new . Hence, in all the cases where the announcement is the first announcement after at least time from the last announcement, the ghost flushing rule acts the same as in BGP. Moreover, the withdrawal is sent only in the cases where the last that was sent is not relevant any more. BGP in this case does not inform the neighbor that the is no longer relevant, this has two drawbacks: 1) the ghost cycling in the network, and negatively effecting the convergence and 2) the routing decision is done according to the wrong . Hence, the packet would route to the wrong direction, and in many cases would cycle until the TTL expires. The ghost flushing rule in this case has two positive effects: 1) flush the ghost information quickly; from Claim 1, after time unites, there are no ghost of length shorter or equal to and 2) eliminating the fact that packets route to the wrong direction, since old information is flushed by the flushing withdrawal message.
The following scenario (Fig. 4) demonstrates the two effects of the flushing rule in case of . The network contains a clique and a backup long path. The route to node (node 0) from any node in the clique should change to go over the alternate long path. However, as can be seen in Fig. 4(c) and (d) , the dissemination of the backup path is delayed, due to the ghost information in the clique. By using the modified BGP with the flushing rule all the ghost information disappears in 4 s (assuming ), and then the backup path converges in additional 4 s (instead of 121 s). Moreover, in the BGP scenario, packets originated from the clique and that are destined to , would cycle in the clique, in the duration of the convergence time, until their time-to-live (TTL) expires (since the convergence time is as high as 121 s, which is more than the time it takes a packet to traverse initial-hops). Notice, that in the case of fail-over, we cannot analytically prove that we reduce the convergence time and we need to support this claim by simulation. As was noted in [8] in this case, the convergence time, may be dominated by two factors-the time until all the ghost information vanishes, and the time it takes to the backup path to propagate in the network assuming no ghost information delays it. In all the cases where the ghost information is a dominating factor of the slow convergence time and not the propagation of the backup path (as in example 4)-the flushing rule would help. In these cases, the flushing rule helps not only to reduce the convergence time but also to reduce the message complexity. The message complexity of the first process, the vanishing of the ghost information, is according to lemma 5.2. The message complexity of the second process, i.e., the propagation of the new , is not any worse because of the ghost flushing rule. Since, when all the ghost information disappears, the state of the destination at the router, may change only to a more preferred . We note that there are some extreme cases in which BGP has a better convergence time than BGP with the flushing rule. These are the cases in which while the of each router is incorrect, the local next-hop decision induced by the is correct. Consider for example the scenario given on the network of Fig. 5 . Assume that in the stabilized network before the failure node routes packets to destination through node . After the failure of link , first receives a withdrawal indicating the failure in the path to through its neighbor . Hence, node changes its path to go through and announces the change to its neighbor ( would change its to . Next receives a withdrawal about the path to from its neighbor . Node then changes its path to go through (assume that before the failure event 's route to is through ). In this case, node has the correct route to in either BGP with or without the flushing rule. The difference between the two algorithms is with the route node has to . In the standard BGP, does not announce its new to due to the timer. While it delays this announcement, incidentally, the packets to would be routed correctly from to : Node chooses the correct next hop, although its is incorrect and node routes through , and from there the packet is routed correctly to . However, if we use the flushing rule, would receive a flushing withdrawal and, hence, would not have a route to . The inverse effect of the above scenario may happen too, i.e., it could be that BGP decides that there is no route, while there is a path to the destination, and in the exact same scenario BGP with the flushing rule makes the correct decision. Consider for example the same scenario, but now prefers a route to that passes through and not through , before the failure event. In this case, using the standard BGP, the router after receiving a withdrawal from would not have a valid path, and will send a withdrawal to . Neither nor could route to , even though there is a route to . Our simulation (see Section VIII-E), shows that in the majority of the cases the flushing rule has better time convergence than the standard BGP also in .
VI. GHOST BUSTER RULE
In the previous section, we proved that the flushing rule guarantees convergence within time units. Here, we want to show that in most likely situations the flushing rule would cause convergence within time units, where is the network diameter. Essentially, the flushing rule reduces the convergence latency because while the announcements propagation in the network is slowed down by the the withdrawal messages are forwarded as fast as possible by the flushing rule. Thus, the withdrawal messages act as a cleaning process that eats up the ghost information, while the ghost information is being blocked by the delay. In order to understand and analyze the effect of combining the ghost flushing rule with the rule, we analyze a more aggressive rule, the ghost buster rule. Implementing it on top of the flushing rule gives a convergence time of . In the ghost buster rule, not only the withdrawals are propagated as fast as possible, but we make sure that announcements are guaranteed to be delayed. Notice that in the original BGP algorithm, in most cases, announcements are delayed due to the timer, especially when the is implemented per peer and not per destination (i.e., for each announcement sent on the corresponding interface, and not for each announcement that corresponds to the same destination). Moreover, a more aggressive delay of announcements may occur due the route damping mechanism [16] , in cases of destinations that change their route frequently. Hence, an effect similar to the ghost buster algorithm occurs in the modified BGP with the ghost flushing rule.
Specifically:
A router announces the preferred new ASpath to its peering, iff it received the announcement about the new ASpath at least delta seconds ago, otherwise it suppresses the announcement until delta time passes.
The key parameter of the ghost busting rule is the ratio between the speed at which withdrawals propagate and the speed at which announcements propagate.
Definition 5: We denote by , the rate of the algorithm, which equals to . Lemma 6.1: Under the busting rule, the convergence time following an event is seconds. Sketch of proof: For the sake of clarity, we take as a bound (and not average time) on one hop delay of any BGP message delivery, including the processing time. However, a similar but more complex proof can be shown, where is the average delay on one hop. By the ghost buster rule the length of the maximum ghost in the network can increase by one only once in time. From the ghost flushing rule, each time units the ghost variable with the minimum length disappear (Lemma 5.1)
Since the maximum length of an is . The equation for is by the definition of , we can replace and get and get Take note that the proof about the ghost buster rule requires that any new announcement be delayed, even an announcement regarding a more preferable . Otherwise, we cannot assume that the head of the ghost segment would grow by one hop each time, since it may encounter a node with a ghost which is less preferable (the ghost can encounter even an empty ). Hence, the ghost buster rule has a negative effect in cases of and since it requires that any new announcement be delayed. However, as mentioned earlier, we argue that BGP with the ghost flushing rule act according to the ghost buster rule anyway, due to the rule.
VII. RESET RULE
The idea behind the ghost buster rule is that the withdrawal message acts as a cleaning process that eats up the ghost information, while the ghost information is being blocked by the delay. However, during this process, a segment of ghost information may traverse some steps in the network before the withdrawal catches the ghost information. Another approach is blocking the ghost information for such a long time period so as to ensure that the withdrawal has eliminated all the ghost information from the network. We have called this algorithm the reset rule. This mechanism is similar to the holddown timer plus route poisoning of IGRP (see Section X-B).
In this section, we try to evaluate the value of in three diffident variants, all of which ensure that all ghost information disappears within one interval. After that interval the propagation of the correct announcement starts. While the three variants are not the most practical, since they require a large delay of announcements, they capture interesting aspects about the convergence behavior of BGP.
At first glance, it seems like setting the timer to be is enough (since this is the time it takes the withdrawal to reach the entire network). However, the value of should increase, assuming that we stick with the rule that the less preferred (possibly ghost information) may be forwarded by the router if it is the first announcement after timer without an announcement. The case in which the first announcement is not delayed is important in order to reach fast convergence when the less preferred is a result of and not . This, however, leads to the fact that should be set higher than , since in the case of ghost information traverses hops without encountering a node that is incapable of sending an announcement, due to . In this section, we show the mechanism in three models.
• Reset Rule-1: If and the flushing rule is employed, then we can prove that the convergence latency is at most s. • Reset Rule-2: The following variation on the mechanism of (that some Internet service providers (ISPs) [2] decided to employ):
A router would send a new announcement iff at least minRouteAdver elapsed from the previous sent announcement, and from previous sent withdrawal.
together with the flushing rule, ensures that if , then the convergence latency is at most seconds. • Reset Rule-3: When applying the previous model to synchronous networks, it is enough if in order to show that the convergence time is at most s.
The huge difference between the synchronous case and the asynchronous case is due to some pathological cases. Hence, in the majority of the cases, also in asynchronous networks, it is enough to have a small to ensure that the time is at most function of in the model of reset rule-2. The reset rule has a disadvantage over the ghost buster rule, since the reset rule timer has the misfunction of adding a huge delay (proportional to broadcast time, that is, proportional to , where is the diameter after the failure.) The ghost buster rule adds only a small delay to each announcement. Moreover, with the ghost buster rule even small delay helps; to produce an aggressive reduction in convergence time, one should set it proportional to (without taking into account ) and get a time convergence, which is proportionally to the actual .
In reality, there are different variant implementations of the . A common variation is to have one such timer for each peer and not per destination. The motivation for this is to store one timer per peer and not per destination (in a BGP table there could be up to 120 000 subnetwork destinations). Hence, in practice, the announcement message are delayed even more, which works to our advantage and when used with the flushing rule would result in a significant reduction in the convergence latencies. We try to evaluate if in most cases which is set to 30 s is high enough to act as the delay required by the reset rule.
We observe that the diameter of the Internet AS graph is very small. In the matrices of shortest path and looking on the real lengths (where the policy routing is taken into account), yields . Hence, for the reset rule-2 mechanism, it would be enough to assure convergence by setting the to be larger than seconds (which is less than 30 s). However, for the reset rule-1, it requires that would be larger than (which if is larger than 1 s a reasonable assumption when including inter AS delay) gives us a larger than 30. Hence, the would play the rule of reset rule-1 only in some of the cases.
The proofs of the three variations of the reset rule appear in Appendix XII.
VIII. SIMULATION
In this section, we compare the time convergence of the basic BGP protocol and the modified BGP protocol, that uses the Ghost flushing rule (see basic code 2) in real and artificial topologies. The simulation results support our claims that the modified BGP performs similarly to the Ghost buster rule or to the reset rule rule and, hence, the convergence time is reduced from to . We did not simulate the Ghost Buster rule and the resets rules, since their purpose is to capture the behavior of BGP with the ghost flushing rule and understanding its effect, and as we argue above, the only rule that we recommend implementing and which would than reduce the convergence time and message complexity is the ghost flushing rule.
A. General Description of the Simulation
We implemented BGP as described in code 2. For the ease of implementation, we assume that BGP chooses the routes ac- cording to the shortest path metric, with no restriction on advertising or accepting messages from peers resulting from policy routing. Tie breaking rule for two equal length routes is based on the ID (AS number) of the peer that advertises that route. Each node represents one AS.
In each simulation interval, each node receives all the messages from its first-in-first out (FIFO) input buffer, processes them (we assume it takes at least 0.25 s), builds new messages and passes these messages from its output buffer to its peers input buffers. We give a random latency to each message ranging between 0.25-2 s. The initial value of each node's MinRouteAdver timer is set randomly to a value between 0-30 s.
Using the simulation, we checked the effect of the removal of either one route (removing of some destination inside an AS) or an edge on the convergence time of the network. At time , all the nodes in the graph were initialized with routing tables as if BGP has reached a stable state.
B. Clique
We started with the simple case of a clique network (complete graph), where we measured the convergence time after the failure of a route to destination (see Fig. 6 ) as a function of the size of the clique. As can be seen the modified BGP, has a fix convergence time, since its behavior is proportional to ).
C. Real Topology
We tested both algorithms performance on the topology that was studied in [1] (see Fig. 7 , which is based on the real example taken from the Internet topology). At time , we removed destination that is announced by . We repeated the experiments 100 times, and draw a histogram of the convergence times. As can be seen in Figs. 8 and 9 , the modified BGP shows dramatic and stable improvements.
D. Core of the Internet
Finally, we compare the convergence times of the two algorithms on the core of the AS network taken from the Internet. We took the routing table of the route server [17] (which is a route server of 41 BGP routers) from consecutive days (4.12.00, 5.12.00, 6.12.00) and created from it the AS graph based on all the of all the routes in the table. For example, if there is an 23,43,123 to destination , we add to the AS Fig. 10 . Convergence time of the original BGP and the modified BGP algorithms following the failure of a link in the topology of Fig. 4 . As can be seen, the convergence latency of the original algorithm is more than 500 s (with 40 nodes), while the new (modified) algorithm converges after about 100 s. graph the directed edges (23,43) and (43,123). After building the AS graph, we have recursively removed nodes that their outdegree is zero. At the end, we were left out with the core which includes 375 nodes with 2186 edges.
We randomly chose ASes from the core, and simulated the failure of a destination (network) inside this AS.
The simulation results (Table II) show that the new (modified) BGP dramatically improves the convergence time. This can be explained by the fact that the core of the Internet is similar in its parameters to a clique. Notice, that we took only the core of the internet, since only in the core the ghost information may cycle and harm convergence.
E. Link Failure
We measure the convergence time in the topology of Fig. 4 , in the case of a link failure (i.e., ) as function of . The topology consists of a clique of size and one alternate path between two nodes of the clique of length . The results are given in Fig. 10 and show that the modified BGP algorithm converges much faster also in this topology (a topology in which the path becomes longer, without loosing any destination).
The above topology of Section VIII-E is unique because, in this case, the ghost information may dramatically harm the convergence of the fail-over event. This is due to the fact that the backup path is dramatically longer than the original path. Hence ,   TABLE III  CONVERGENCE TIME IN CASE OF FAIL-OVER the ghost message may traverse for a long time and disappear only when the ghost becomes longer than the backup path. In order to see the impact of the ghost flushing rule in topology in which the ghost vanishes quickly, we repeat the experiment of link failure on the real topology of Fig. 7 . Here, the backup path is a similar length as the original path.
For each link in the graph, we simulate its failure and calculate the time convergence after the failure using the BGP and the BGP with the flushing rule (Table III) . We repeat the test 40 times and calculate the average. We use two definitions of convergence (in case the fail-down events are identical). The first definition, convergence, is the convergence time until the is correct. The second definition, convergence, is the convergence time until the induced by the is correct, that is, until the routing according to the table is correct. We gave a detailed scenario in Section V-A, where we explained how a network may converge faster according to convergence than according to convergence. Our results showed that, while BGP and BGP with the flushing rule converge more or less in the same time (32.3 versus 31.9) according to the definition of convergence, the BGP converges with the flushing rule faster than the original BGP according to the convergence definition (15.8 versus 11.08).
IX. RELATED WORK: COMPARISON WITH COUNTING TO INFINITY PREVENTION TECHNIQUES
While the main goal of this work is to improve the convergence time of BGP, the ghost buster rule and ghost flushing rule may also be beneficial to the understanding of distance vector protocols and dealing with their counting to infinity problem.
Notice that counting to infinity is a slightly different problem than the BGP convergence. In counting to infinity, we try to reduce the convergence time, so it would not be bounded by infinity, the bound of the maximum hop count. In BGP, the convergence time is bounded by -the maximum length of a loop free . A careful look at the proof leads to the following conclusion: all the mechanisms we introduced in this paper (ghost buster, flushing, and reset rule) do not use or rely on the . Therefore, these mechanisms can be added to any distance vector algorithm that prevents looping to infinity. Furthermore, these mechanism bound the convergence latency following or by a function of . Moreover one may adjust, distance vector protocols, such as RIP, so that the counting to infinity problem is solved, without changing the algorithm, only by either changing or adding timers. However, the ghost buster algorithm has a negative effect: adding the delay increases the convergence latency of to seconds from seconds. However, as in BGP, in many algorithms a version of a delay exists anyhow (for example, aggregation of announcements, periodic updates, etc.).
X. COMPARISONS WITH COUNTING TO INFINITY SOLUTIONS
In this section, we review mechanisms to deal with counting to infinity that do not require additional state to the messages.
A. RIP Mechanisms
Two mechanisms are used in the RIP routing protocol to reduce the counting to infinity problem.
• Split Horizon-An announcement for a given neighbor should omit routes that their next hop is that neighbor. This mechanism is aimed at preventing loops between adjacent gateways (loop eliminated in BGP with the mechanism) and not relevant to BGP algorithm. • Reverse Poisoning-a variant on split horizon, where instead of omitting the routes, an announcement is sent with infinity as a distance metric.
B. IGRP Mechanisms
IGRP (which is based on RIP) adds the following mechanisms to the RIP solutions.
• Trigger Update-The interdomain distance vector sent a periodic updates on a regular basis (for example in IGRP this timer is by default 90 s). Trigger update is an update that is sent immediately after a change in order to propagate failure quickly in the network. However, trigger update, does not discriminate announcements from withdrawals as in BGP with ghost buster rule. Notice that in BGP all the updates are triggered, but with the rule of . The fact that there is no periodic update in BGP is due to the fact that BGP runs over transmission control protocol (TCP), while RIP and IGRP over user datagram protocol (UDP) or directly over Internet protocol (IP). • Hold-Down Timers-When a route to a destination is removed, i.e., the current route becomes unavailable, this destination is put into hold-down, where no new route to this destination is accepted. The hold-down time should be set to several times the broadcast time. The default value is three times the broadcast time plus 10 s, which in the new versions is set to 280 s. Notice that this mechanism for handling counting to infinity problem would not help in the BGP clique example (in that bad scenario-a router whose route to a destination is removed does not change again to a new route).
• Route Poisoning-when an announcement increases sufficiently, the metric for an existing route the route should be removed. There are two types of definitions for sufficiently increasing the metric: 1) increasing the weight of the route by a factor greater than 1.1 and 2) any increase of the hop count. (This version is called the stronger version of route poisoning.) The motivation for this rule is the fact that route's elongation could be evidence of a loop. Hence, the route is removed, to be on the safe side. If this path is a legitimate one-it will be reinstalled at the next periodic update. Notice that route poisoning resembles the ghost flushing rule. The main different between the two methods is that the route poisoning sends a withdrawal in all cases of increasing the distance, while the ghost flushing rule sends a withdrawal only in the cases where it cannot send a new . Combining route poisoning with the hold-down timer has a similar effect as the reset rule algorithm. Both clean all the information from the network regarding the failure destination during the hold-down timer. Notice that the reset rule-1, unlike route poisoning, sends a withdrawal only if it receives a change to a less preferable after from the last change in . This variation results in better convergence time in some the of the cases.
XI. CONCLUSION
One conclusion from this paper is how sensitive BGP is to minor modifications of some of its parameters. We believe this sensitivity is shared with most distributed algorithms in which a small twist could turn things around.
We note, that a careful look shows that the flushing rule technique does not depend on the propriety, and any other metric may replace the selection rule in the technique. Hence, as a by product of this work, a new stateless mechanism to overcome the counting to infinity problem is provided, which compares favorably with other known stateless mechanisms (in RIP and IGRP).
APPENDIX
A. Reset Rule-1
In this section, we prove that if we use reset rule-1, then BGP converges in time. Recall that in reset rule-1, we used the Ghost flushing rule and set to seconds.
Lemma 12.1: The converge time complexity of reset rule-1 follows is seconds. Sketch of proof: Let become unreachable. We show that there is no node or message with nonempty to after time. For clarity and simplicity, we use in the below proofs, the term to indicate to , since we are only interested in the convergence of the information to reach . Let us first review over the way in which ghost information is created and how it traverses over the network. The source of the ghost information is a value of before the .
Recall, that this value can be the node's current (and its corresponding next hop) or the information stored in a router for each peer, about the currently preferred of that peer, or the currently in a BGP message. After all the old information about should disappear, however, some left over of the information about before the begin to traverse in the network.
Let us recall how an announcement message traverse over the network. When a node receives an announcement from a neighbor , stores in its memory the of the announcement as the last announced by . When finds out that its best goes through , it chooses to route through . If does not elapse from the previously announced message, it announces its new in the announcement . The in will be longer by one than the in the announcement . We say that the announcement traverses, and become message .
In Claim 5, we showed that a ghost announcement can traverse until its is of the maximum length of without reaching a block that cannot send a new announcement. We call this node a block node, since the node is blocked from sending new announcements. Hence, the block node stops the traverse of the ghost announcement until the timer elapses. The node is blocked, since the timer, which is set to , did not elapse from its last announcement.
Because the maximum in an announcement that traverses over the network was of length , we can conclude that there is also no node with longer than (since before , the maximum was , and after the maximum announce was of length , and a node can change its only by adopting a that was announced to it).
Recall that due to the flushing rule, after time, there is no node or message with of length less or equal to (from Claim 1 of Lemma 5.1). The lemma follows, since we proved that the maximum is of length , and we proved in Claim 5 that the maximum in the network is of length . Hence, after from , all the nodes and messages contain a NULL to . In order to prove Claim 5, we first need to begin with some definitions.
Definition 6: A node is blocked if, according to the rule, it cannot send any new announcements. Definition 7: The routing tree to destination is the tree induced by the routing decisions of the routers in the network when the network is in a stable state before , i.e., the set of links with which traffic to would be forwarded. Definition 8: An edge ( ) in the graph is a cross edge if it connects two nodes in the routing tree, if is not the child of in the routing tree and is not the child of in the routing tree.
Definition 9: The level of a node is the length of its current in the stable state (before the failure). Let be a cross link. Corollary 2:
in the routing tree before the failure.
Straight forward from the optimality of the routing tree to before the failure. Let be a cross edge. Claim 3: If one of the endpoint or changes its original (its before the failure), then one of the end points of the cross edge is blocked.
Let us look at the first time that one of the end points of the cross edge changes its state. Without the loss of generality, assume it is node . Hence, when changes its state it has in the memory that its peer has the original . Hence, changes its to a valid and not a NULL . Therefore, it sends an announcement, and it cannot send another announcement for the next seconds.
Let us look at time unit after the link failure, where . Let be a cross link. Let be a node in level . Let a ghost announcement traverse between to . Let accepts the ghost of the announcements, and send a ghost announcement to all of its peers. Then, the following.
Claim 4: The new ghost announcements are with of maximum length. Proof: Let us look at the time just before sent the announcement to . In this time, still has its original . Otherwise, or is blocked (from Claim 3) and, hence, cannot send the announcement to , or could not send an announcement to its neighbor after changing its . Contradiction.
The original of is with maximum length (from 2), and if changes its current , its new is with maximum length of , since otherwise it would choose to route through , whose is of the length . Hence, when chooses to route through (since for example the neighbor that routes through to would change its to longer one) its new would be of a maximum of length . Node would announce to each of its peers the new (of length of maximum ) to through it, and become blocked.
Let us look at time after event. Claim 5: A ghost announcement has a maximum of length before the ghost announcement reach a block node.
Sketch of proof: We show that a ghost announcement may reach a maximum of in its traversal, before reaching a block node.
Let us look at the different courses that a ghost announcement may traverse over a network. The source of the ghost announcement is based on some left over ghost information in the network such as, the current , or the of a node in the memory of its peers. The length of this is smaller than . Let us look at the last cross link that the ghost message traverses, whose two endpoints are not blocked.
If such a cross link exists, the announcement after the traverse on the link has with length of (from Claim 4). After traversing the cross link, it can traverse the induced routing tree (where the tree is set according to the routing tree to before the failure). Due to the anti-loop mechanism, the ghost announcement may traverse the maximum length of hops up the tree, and then hops down the tree without reaching a cross link, where one of its endpoints is blocked. (Notice that the message cannot traverse to reach the root of the routing tree, since the root is the of the . The anti-looping mechanism of BGP would prevent this, since in any ghost announcement about , the first in its is the of ). Traversing through that cross link, the may be increased by one more hop. Hence, the maximum length is . If such a cross link does not exist, then the message, with value of a maximum of before the failure, may have a maximum traverse up and down the induced routing tree, and then over a cross link that ended in a blocked node (1 more hops). Hence, the maximum length is of in this scenario. Hence, a ghost announcement has a maximum of length before the ghost announcement reach a blocked node.
B. Reset Rule-2
In this section, we prove that if we use reset rule-2, then the BGP converges in time. In reset rule-2, we use the Ghost flushing rule and to set , and a withdrawal message also set to the timer. Lemma 12.2: The converge time complexity of reset rule-2 follows is seconds. We first prove in the following Claim 7 that a ghost announcement reaches of maximum length of before reaching a blocked node. From Claim 1 of Lemma 5.1, after time all the announcements with with length equal or less than disappear. And the lemma follows.
Observation 6: Using reset rule-2, if a node changes its , then the node is blocked. Notice that with the modification of any change of a node, blocks the node. While in the original , a rule a change to a NULL would not block the node. (It has no way to reach its destination.) Claim 7: Ghost information can have maximum of length of without reaching a blocked node. Sketch of proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 5, but here a ghost announcement can traverse only down the routing tree after passing the cross edge. This is due to the fact that if the message traverses the edge , then the of was changed. This can happen only if the of has changed due to the change in the of parent. Hence, parent sent an announcement or withdrawal, and is blocked.
Let us look at the last cross link ( ) unblock that the announcement has transferred, and assume level is . If such a cross link exists, the of the ghost announcement after traversing the cross link has a of maximum (from Claim 4). After traversing the cross edge, the ghost announcement can have a maximum traverse length down the induced routing tree, for hops, until traversing a cross link whose end point is blocked (1 more), i.e., maximum length of .
If no such cross link exist, let us consider the source of the ghost announcement at some node of level . The source of the ghost message may be with maximum of length (since the maximum can occur when a node stores the according to its peer at level ), and the ghost message may have a maximum traverse length down the routing tree for steps, and then traverse a cross link that ended in a blocked node (one hop) more, i.e., maximum length of . Hence, a ghost announcement has a maximum of length before the ghost announcement reaches a blocked node.
C. Reset Rule-3
In this section, we prove that if we use the reset rule-3 algorithm, then the BGP converges in time. In reset rule-3, we use the Ghost flushing rule and the is set to . The reset rule-3 applies only on a synchronous model, where the withdrawal message sets the timer. to NULL , i.e., no path to destination. The nodes send withdrawal message to their neighbors, if their last message to their neighbors was not a withdrawal message. 6) Nodes with a level less than , have a NULL, , and do not send any message. Proof: By induction on time. Let . We need only to prove part 1 of the claim. All the nodes of level 1 change their due to the flushing rule and Claim 1. Their new has a maximum length of 3 (since, their neighbors are of level 2, which announce their maximum of length 3). The nodes of level 1 sends a message (announcement or withdrawal) regarding the change of and, hence, become blocked until round 4, that is, until the timer would have elapsed.
Let the claim hold until round , we prove that the claim holds also for round .
Proof of part 1 of the claim: Let us look at nodes of level . It easy to see that from variations on Claim 1 for the synchronous case, at round , the nodes of level change their for the first time. The new can be changed based of the last announced of their three types of neighbors.
1) Neighbors of level , that from the inductive step announce a of maximum length . 2) From neighbors of level , that their last announced has maximum length of , since they still have their original . 3) From neighbors of level whose last announcement was of length , since they still have their original . Hence, their new is of maximum length of . The nodes announce their change and, hence, become blocked until .
Proof of part 2 of the claim: Let us look at nodes of the level . Their can be changed based on the last announced of their three kinds of neighbors. 1) Neighbors of level , that from the induction claim part 1, their last message was sent at round with of maximum length of . 2) Neighbors of level that from the induction claim part 1 of their last announced was of length .
3) Neighbors of level that their last announced was of length (since they still did not change their original ). Hence, the of nodes of level may change to with a maximum length of . However, notice that since this nodes are blocked (from induction claim part 1), they would not send any message to inform of the change to the neighbors.
Proof of part 3 of the claim: Let us look at nodes of level . The nodes can be changed based on the last announced of their three kinds of neighbors. 1) Nodes of level that from the induction claim part 1, their last message was sent at round with of a maximum length of . 2) Neighbors of level that from the induction claim part 1 their last announced was of length . 3) Neighbors of level , whose last announced was of length from the induction claim part 1. Hence, the of nodes of level may change to with a maximum length of . However, notice that since these nodes are blocked (from induction claim part 2), they would not send any message to inform of the change to the neighbors.
Proof of part 4 of the claim: Let us look at nodes of level . From the induction claim 3, they had of in round . In round , the nodes of level did not receive any new (since the nodes of level , and are in a blocked state from the induction claim part 1).
Proof of part 5 of the claim: Let us look at the nodes of level . From the induction claim part 4, their at round is of the maximum length of . The nodes did not receive any new message, due to the fact that at round , the nodes of level , did not send any new messages (from induction claim part 1), and nodes of level did not send any announcements (from induction Claim 5 they could only send a withdrawal). From Claim 1 at round , there are no nodes with of length . However, the nodes of level cannot change to other then NULL, since the last announcements received by them were with of maximum length . Hence, the nodes of level change their to NULL and send withdrawal if the last message sent by them was different from the withdrawal.
Proof of part 6 of the claim: Let us look at nodes of the level or lower. The claim follows from the fact that the nodes do not receive any new announcement and, hence, do not change their state from the previous state which was NULL and do not send any new message. To prove that, let us look at round : From the induction step part 6, nodes of a level lower than did not send any new messages during this round. From the induction step part 5 nodes of level did not send any announcements (maybe they sent a withdrawal), and nodes of level did not send any new announcements due to the induction step part 1.
